| Anglo-Nepalese War | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Balbhadra Kunwar, Gurkha commander of the Anglo-Nepalese War |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| British East India Company Patiala State |
Kingdom of Nepal | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Francis Rawdon-Hastings David Ochterlony Rollo Gillespie† Bennet Marley John Sullivan Wood |
Bhimsen Thapa Amar Singh Thapa Ranjur Singh Thapa Bhakti Thapa† |
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| Strength | |||||||
| 22,000 men, with sixty guns (First campaign)[1][2] 17,000 (Second campaign)[3] |
less than 12,000 [4] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Unknown | Unknown | ||||||
The Gurkha War (1814–1816), sometimes called the Gorkha War or the Anglo–Nepalese War, was fought between the Kingdom of Nepal (now Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal) and the British East India Company as a result of border disputes and ambitious expansionism of both the belligerent parties. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816, which ceded around a third of Nepal's territory to the British.
The British were the invading forces, while the Nepalese maintained a defensive position. The British attacked in two successive waves of invasion. It was the most expensive war waged during the governorship of Lord Moira.
Contents |
The Shah era of Nepal began with the invasion of Kathmandu valley, which consisted of the capitals of Malla confederacy that ruled Nepal during the medieval era of Nepal.
In 1767, a request to the British for help by the Nepalese Malla confederacy under threat from Gorkha invasion resulted in an ill-equipped and ill-prepared expedition numbering 2,500 led by Captain Kinloch. The expedition was a disaster; the Gorkha army easily overpowered those who had not succumbed to malaria or desertion. This ineffectual British force provided the Gorkhas with firearms and filled them with suspicion, causing some to underestimate their future opponents.
The invasion of Nepal resulted with Gorkha kingdom being renamed as Nepal and the shift of the capital of the kingdom from Gorkha to Kathmandu. Also, the invasion of economically sound medieval Nepal provided the Gurkha army economic support for furthering their martial practices throughout the region. The martial campaign in eastern region was largely a failure. After a number of defeats by the Limbuwan army, the Gurkha army finally made peace treaty with Limbuwan and incorporated the Limbuwan states into Nepal under a mutual pact. In the west, all rulers as far as the Kali River had submitted or been replaced by 1790. Farther west still, the Kumaon region and its capital Almora had also succumbed to the Gorkhas.
To the north however, aggressive raids into Tibet (concerning a long-standing dispute over trade and control of the mountain passes) triggered the Chinese intervention. In 1792 the Qianlong Emperor sent an army, expelling the Nepalese from Tibet to within 5 km of their capital at Kathmandu. Acting regent Bahadur Shah, (Prithvi Naryan’s son), appealed to the British Governor-General of India, Francis Rawdon-Hastings, Lord Moira for help. Anxious to avoid confrontation with the Chinese, Lord Moira sent Captain Kirkpatrick as mediator, but before he arrived the war with China had finished. The Nepalese were forced into signing a humiliating treaty revoking their trading privileges in Tibet and requiring them to pay tribute to Peking every five years.
The Tibet affair had postponed a previously planned attack on the Garhwal Kingdom, but by 1803 Raja of Garhwal Pradyuman Shah had also been defeated. He was killed in the struggle in January 1804, and all his land annexed. Further west, general Amar Singh Thapa overran lands as far as the Kangra – the strongest fort in the hill region – and laid siege to it (although by 1809, Ranjit Singh the ruler of the Sikh state in the Punjab, had intervened and driven the Nepalese army east of the Sutlej river).
The British were also expanding their sphere of influence at an alarming rate. While the Gorkhas had been expanding their empire – into Sikkim in the east, Kumaon and Garhwal in the west and into the British sphere of influence in Awadh, or Oudh as the British called it, in the south – the British East India Company had consolidated its position in India from its main bases of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. This British expansion had already been resisted in India, culminating in three Anglo-Maratha wars as well as in the Punjab where Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Empire had their own aspirations.
The acquisition of the Nawab of Awadh's lands by the British East India Company brought the region of Gorakhpur into the close proximity of the raja of Palpa – the last remaining independent town within the Gorkha heartlands. Palpa and Butwal were originally two separate principalities; they were afterwards united under one independent Rajput prince, who, having conquered Butwal, added it to his hereditary possessions of Palpa. The lands of Butwal, though conquered and annexed, were yet held in fief, or paid an annual sum, first to Awadh, and afterwards, by transfer, to the British.[5][6] During the regency of Rani Rajendra Laxmi, towards the close of the 18th century, the hill country of Palpa was conquered and annexed to Nepal. The rajah retreated to Butwal, but was subsequently induced, under false promises of redress, to visit Kathmandu, where he was put to death, and his territories in Butwal seized and occupied by the Gorkhas.[6] Bhimsen Thapa, the Nepalese prime minister from 1806 to 1837, installed his own father as governor of Palpa, leading to serious border disputes between the two powers. The "illegal" occupation from 1804 till 1812 to the Terai of Butwal by the Nepalese, which was under British protection, was the immediate reason which led to the Anglo-Nepal war in 1814.[6] [7] [8]
These disputes arose because there was no fixed boundary separating the Gorkhas and the British. A struggle with the former was unpromising as the British were ignorant of the country or its resources and, despite their technological superiority, it was a received persuasion that the nature of the mountainous tract, which they would have to penetrate, would be as baffling to them as it had been to all the efforts of many successive Mahomedan sovereigns.[9] A border commission imposed on Nepal by the Governor-General failed to solve the problem. The Gorkha Commissioners had remarked to the British the futility of debating about a few square miles of territory since there never could be real peace between the two States, until the British should yield to the Gorkhas British provinces north of the Ganges, making that river the boundary between the two, "as heaven had evidently designed it to be."[9] In the mean time, the British found that the Nepalese were preparing for war; that they had for some time been laying up large stores of saltpetre; purchasing and fabricating arms, and organizing and disciplining their troops under some European deserters in this service, after the model of the companies of East India's sepoy battalions.[5] The conviction that the Gorkha raids into the flatland's of the Terai, a much prized strip of fertile ground separating the Nepalese hill country from India, increased tensions[9] – the British felt their power in the region and their tenuous lines of communication between Calcutta and the northwest were under threat. Since there was no clear border, confrontation between the two powers was "necessary and unavoidable".[10] Britain formally declared war with Nepal on 1 Nov, 1814.[11]
When the Kathmandu Durbar solicited Gorkha chiefs’ opinions about a possible war with the British, Amar Singh was not alone in his opposition, declaring that – "They will not rest satisfied without establishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the hill rajas, whom we have dispossessed. We have hitherto but hunted deer; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to fight tigers."[12] He was against the measures adopted in Butwal and Sheeoraj, which he declared to have originated in the selfish views of persons, who scrupled not to involve the nation in war to gratify their personal avarice.[13][12]
This contrasts sharply with the prime minister Bhimsen Thapa – " ... our hills and fastness are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable."[14][15] This stance by Bhimsen Thapa is not surprising, as insinuated by Amar Singh, considering the fact that his father had made the usurpations in Butwal and Sheoraj, and whose family derived most of the advantages.[13] Prinsep estimates that the revenue of the usurped lands could not have been less than a lakh of rupees a year to the Gurkhas, in the manner they collected it: the retention of this income was therefore an object of no small importance to the ambitious views of Bhimsen Thapa and the preservation of the influence he had contrived to establish for his family.[13] The Gorkha prime minister realized the Nepalese had several advantages over the British including knowledge of the region and recent experience fighting in the mountainous terrain. However, the British had numerical superiority and far more modern weapons.
In the meantime, the Governor-General believed that "the difficulties of mountain warfare were greater on the defensive side than on that of a well conducted offensive operation."[9]
The Governor-General looked towards the Nawab of Awadh to finance the impending warfare with the Gurkha kingdom: two crores (same as two million) of rupees were solicited. Of this matter he writes:
"...Saadut Ali[16] unexpectedly died. I found, however, that what had been provisionally agitated with him was perfectly understood by his successor,[17] so that the latter came forward with a spontaneous offer of a crore of rupees, which I declined as a peishcush or tribute on his accession to the sovereignty of Oude, but accepted as a loan for the Honourable Company. Eight lacs were afterwards added to this sum, in order that the interest of the whole, at six per cent, might equal the allowances to different branches of the Nawab Vizier's family, for which guarantee of the British Government had been pledged, and the payment of which, without vexatious retardments, was secured, by the appropriation of the interest to the specific purpose. The sum thus obtained was thrown into the general treasury, whence I looked to draw such portions of it as the demands of the approaching service might require. My surprise is not to be expressed, when I was shortly after informed from Calcutta, that it had been deemed expedient to employ fifty four lacs of the sum obtained by me in discharging an eight per cent loan, that the remainder was indispensable for current purposes, and it was hoped I should be able to procure from the Nawab Vizier a further aid for the objects of the war. This took place early in autumn, and operations against Nepaul could not commence till the middle of November, on which account the Council did not apprehend my being subjected to any sudden inconvenience through its disposal of the first sum. Luckily I was upon such frank terms with the Nawab Vizier, as that I could explain to him fairly my circumstances. He agreed to furnish another crore; so that the Honourable Company was accommodated with above two millions and a half sterling on my simple receipt."[18]
In the aftermath of the war, he writes:
"The richest portion of the territory conquered by us bordered on the dominions the Nawab Vizier. I arranged the transfer of that tract to him in extinction of the second crore which I had borrowed. Of that crore the charges of the war absorbed fifty two lacs: forty eight lacs (₤600,000) were consequently left in the treasury, a clear gain to the Honourable Company, in addition to the benefit of precluding future annoyance from an insolent neighbour."[18]
This was in contrast with the Nepalese who had spent huge amount of resources on the first and second wars against the Tibetans, which had not fared well for the Nepalese.
To the British, who were used to fighting in the plains, but were unacquainted with the terrain of the hills, the formidability of the topology is expressed by one anonymous British soldier as such:
"...The territory subject to Nipal consists of a mountainous tract of country, lying between Tibet and the valley of the Ganges, in breadth not exceeding one hundred miles, but in length stretching nearly along the whole extent of the north-west frontier of the British dominions. Below the hills they held possession of a portion of the plain of irregular width, distinguished by the name of the Nipal Turrye [19], but the period at which the acquisition was made is not ascertained.
The general military character of the country is that of extreme difficulty. Immediately at the front of the hills the plain is covered with the Great Saul Forest,[20] for an average width of ten or twelve miles; the masses of the mountains are immense, their sides steep, and covered with impenetrable jungle. The trenches in these ridges are generally water-courses, and rather chasms or gulfs than any thing that deserves the name of a valley. The roads are very insecure, and invariably pathways over mountains, or the beds of rivers, the usual means of transport throughout the country being by hill porters. Notwithstanding this general description, spaces comparatively open and hollow, and elevated tracts of tolerably level land, are to be met with, but so completely detached as to contribute but little to facilitate intercourse.
One of the largest and most fertile of these constitutes the valley of Nipal Proper.[21] To the westward of Nipal, there is a difficult tract, till the country again opens in the valley of Gorkah, the original possession of the present dynasty. -- Westward of this the country is again difficult, till it somewhat improves in the district of Kemaoon.[22] Further to the westward lies the valley of the Dhoon,[23] and the territory of Sue-na-Ghur;[24] and further still, the more recent conquests, stretching to the village, in which Umar Sing,[25] a chief of uncommon talents, commanded, and indeed, exercised an authority almost independent."[10]
The initial British campaign was an attack on two fronts across a frontier of more than 1,500 km (930miles), from the Sutlej to the Koshi. In the eastern front, Major-General Bennet Harley and Major-General John Sullivan Wood led their respective columns across the Tarai towards the heart of the valley of Kathmandu. Major-General Rollo Gillespie and Colonel David Ochterlony columns in the western front. These columns were faced with the Gorkha army under the command of Amar Singh Thapa.[26] About the beginning of October, 1814, the British troops began to move towards different depots; and the army was soon after formed into four divisions, one at Benares, one at Meeruth, one at Dinapur, and one at Ludhiana.
The first division, at Dinapur, being the largest, was commanded by Major-General Marley, and was intended to seize the pass at Makwanpur, between Gunduk and Bagmati, the key to Nepal, and to push forward to Kathmandu: thus at once carrying the war into the heart of the enemy's country. [26][27] This force consisted of 8,000 men, including his Majesty's 24th foot of 907 strong; there was a train attached to it of four 18-pounders, eight 6- and 3-pounders, and fourteen mortars and howitzers.[28][29]
The second division, at Benares, under command of Major-General Wood, having subsequently removed to Gorakhpur, was meant to enter the hills by the Bhootnuill pass, and, turning to the eastward, to penetrate the hilly districts, towards Kathmandu, and cooperate with the first division, while its success would have divided the enemy's country and force into two parts, cutting off all the troops in Kumaon and Garhwal from communication with the capital. [26] [27] Its force consisted of his Majesty's 17th foot, 950 strong, and about 3000 infantry, totaling 4,494 men; it had a train of seven 6- and 3-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. [28][30]
The third division, was formed at Meerut, under Major-General Gillespie; and it was purposed to march directly to the Dehra Dun; and having reduced the forts in that valley, to move, as might be deemed expedient, to the eastward, to recover Srinagar from the troops of Amar Singh Thapa; or to the westward, to gain the post of Nahan, the chief town of Sirmaur, where Ranjore Singh Thapa held the government for this father, Amar Singh; and so sweep on towards the Sutlej, in order to cut off that chief from the rest, and thus to reduce him to terms.[26][27] This division originally consisted of his Majesty's 53d, which with artillery and a few dismounted dragoons, made up about one thousand Europeans, and two thousand five hundred native infantry, totaling 3,513 men. [28][30]
The fourth, or north-western division, at Ludhiana, was to operate in the hilly country lying near the Sutlej: it assembled under Brigadier-General Ochterlony, and was destined to advance against the strong and extensive cluster of posts held by Amar Singh and the troops under his immediate orders at and surrounding Irkee, a considerable town of Kahlur, and to cooperate with the forces under Major-General Gillespie, moving downwards among the hills, when these positions should be forced, surrounding Amar Singh, and driving him upon that army.[26][27] The force consisted exclusively of native infantry and artillery, and amounted to 5,993 men; it had a train of two 18-pounder, ten 6-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. [28][31]
Lastly, beyond the Koshi eastward, Major Latter was furnished with two thousand men, including his district battalion, for the defence of the Poornea frontier. This officer was desired to open a communication with the Raja of Sikkim, and to give him every assistance and encouragement to expel the Gurkhas from the eastern hills, short of an actual advance of troops for the purpose.[29]
The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was Lord Moira. All four divisions composed mostly of Indian Sepoys. Ochterlony's army was the only division without a single British battalion.
Major General Marley was tasked to occupy Hetauda and capture the fortresses of Hariharpur and Makawanpur before proceeding to Kathmandu. His frontage of advance lay between Rapati river and Bagmati river. After additional reinforcements, he had 12,000 troops for his offensive against the Makawanpur and Hariharpur axis. A big attack base was established but Major General Marley showed reluctance to take risks against the Nepalese. Some skirmishes had already started taking place. Similarly, Major General George Wood, sometimes known as the Tiger of the British Indian Army, proved exceedingly cautious against the hard charging Nepalese.
Colonel[32] Ranabir Singh Thapa, brother of Bhimsen Thapa, was to be the Sector Commander of Makawanpur-Hariharpur axis. He was given a very large fortress and about 4,000 troops with old rifles and a few pieces of cannons. But the British could not move forward from the border. Colonel Ranabir Singh Thapa had been trying to lure the enemies to his selected killing area. But Major General Wood would not venture forward from Bara Gadhi and he eventually fell back to Betiya.
With the help of an ousted Palpali king, Major General Wood planned to march on Siuraj, Jit Gadhi and Nuwakot with a view to bypass the Butwol defenses, flushing out minor opposition on the axis, and assault Palpa from a less guarded flank. Nepalese Colonel Ujir Singh Thapa had deployed his 1200 troops in many defensive positions including Jit Gadhi, Nuwakot Gadhi and Kathe Gadhi. The troops under Colonel Ujir were very disciplined and he himself was a dedicated and able commander. He was famous for exploiting advantage in men, material, natural resources and well versed in mountain tactics. The British advance took place on 22nd Poush1871 BS (January 1814 AD) to Jit Gadh. While they were advancing to this fortress, crossing the Tinau River, the Nepalese troops opened fire from the fortress. Another of the attackers’ columns was advancing to capture Tansen Bazar. Here too, Nepalese spoiling attacks forced the General to fall back to Gorakhpur. About 70 Nepalese lost their lives in Nuwakot Gadhi. Meanwhile, more than 300 of the enemy perished.
No special military action had taken place in Hariharpur Gadhi fortress in the first campaign. Major General Bannet Marley and Major General George Wood had not been able to advance for an offensive against Makawanpur and Hariharpur Gadhi fortresses.
Among the four divisions, Major-General Gillespie was the first penetrate the enemy's frontier.[33] When Bal Bhadra Kunwar, commander of the Nepalese Army defences there, heard of the approach of the British Army and its size, he realized that it would be impossible to defend the city. He withdrew from Dehradun and moved his force of about six hundred men[33] , mainly of Purano Gorakh Batallion including dependents, to a hill Northeast of the city, where he took up position in the small fort of Nalapani, Khalanga. On the 22 October, well before the declaration of war, Gillespie seized the Keree pass leading into Doon and thence proceeded to Dehra the principal town in the valley without meeting any opposition.[33]
The first British attack on Nalapani took place on 31 October, the day before the official declaration of war.[34] Gillespie’s plan was to storm the fort from four sides; however only two columns managed to respond to his signal for attack.[35] These two columns were 611 and 939 strong.[35] Under cover of fire, pioneers twice swarmed up to the walls, only to be cut down by the enfilade fire of Bal Bhadra’s cannon along a great part of the wall.[35] Gillespie’s men fell back. Seeing this, Gillespie, who until this time had stayed with the artillery battery, moved forward to personally rally his men;[35] but when he got within a few yards of the wall a Nepalese marksman shot him through the heart, and fell dead.[36] The dead of the General forced the invaders for retreat.[36] The total British casualties for the day was 32 dead and 228 wounded.[36] Marley and Wood never really recovered from the shock of Gillespie’s death, and even with very substantial reinforcements they could not be brought to engage the Nepalese Army in their respective areas of responsibility.
Colonel Mawbey, who was next in command at Nalapani,[36] retired to Dehra until 24 November for the heavy guns could arrive from Delhi.[37] After the reinforcements, the war commenced on 25 November, and the fort was continuously bombarded for three days until a large section of the wall gave away.[37] The British forces twice tried to mount the breach the very same day, but were repelled, by dogged defending by the Nepalese, into an exposed position just outside the wall.[37] An attempt was then made to fire one of the light guns into the breach so that the British could mount the wall in the cover of gun smoke.[38] But that attempt too came to nothing.[38] The day ended with the British retreating after spending two hours in the exposed position,[38] at immense British fatality. British casualties for the day mounted to 37 dead and over four hundred men wounded.[38] And still Bal Bhadra held his position.
After these two failed attempts by the British to take over the fort, Mawbey then instructed his, by now strongly reinforced, gunners to fire into the fort, and he sent scouts out to discover the fort's water sources.[39] The water supply was finally blocked, and after three days of thirst, the Nepalese were forced to evacuate the fort on 30 November.[39] Bal Bhadra and some seventy of his surviving men were able to cut their way through and escape into the hills.[39] When the British troops entered the fort, it was found in a "shocking state, full of the remains of men and women killed by the shot shells of our batteries; a number of were likewise lying about, and the stench was intolerable."[40] Upwards of ninety bodies were found dead, while the wounded were sent to British hospitals; the fort was then razed to the ground.[40]
Nalapani had cost both sides dearly, but in Nahan and Jaithak, further West, they were to suffer more. Kazi Amar Singh Thapa’s son, Ranajor Singh Thapa, was in command there. Nahan had been left undefended, and Ranajor Singh set up his defences at Jaithak on a ridge overlooking Nahan. Major-General Martindell, who had meanwhile assumed command of Gillespie’s forces, took possession of Nahan on 25 December and immediately set about preparations for the attack on Ranajor Singh’s positions.
The result of the first day’s battle at Jaithak was almost a repetition of the first day at Nala Pani for the British. They were the very troops who had fought at Nalapani - British grenadiers, not just the native sepoys. During the night of 25th December, Major Richards set out first taking his troops on a wide sixteen mile sweep around to the North to get into position for the attack on Ranajor Singh’s ridge, early the next morning. Major Ludlow, who led the attack up the Southern slope of the ridge, left camp in the early hours of the 26th. The combined force of British grenadiers and Indian sepoys carried on to a small ruined temple, where they were to await the attack by Major Richard’s party to the North. In the distance a small, lightly defended Nepalese Army stockade was seen which the British grenadiers in Ludlow’s force attacked to avenge the humiliation they were suffering. This was a questionable move as it meant abandoning the original battle plan.
Jaspao Thapa who had concealed the major part of his forces in a slight hollow behind that stockade, sent out flanking parties on both sides of the British troops. When the force of the British charge was broken on the stockade itself, these flankers caught the British in a deadly cross-fire. The Nepalese Army soldiers pursued the British down the mountain side. The Indian sepoys who were waiting in the assigned area to the rear were caught up in the rush of the retreat, which rapidly developed into a rout. Ludlow and his men, defeated and exhausted, arrived back in camp at the foot of the ridge before 1000 that morning, before, in fact, the attack had even been scheduled to begin.
Meanwhile, Major Richards and his men on the Northern approaches managed to secure a point on the top of the ridge and hold it throughout most of the day. But they were pinned down by Nepalese Army fire, and instead of reinforcing them, Martindell, fearing another Nalapani, ordered Richards and his men to retreat. This first day of battle at Jaithak cost the British over three hundred men dead and wounded and cooled Martindell’s ardour for battle. For over a month and a half, he refused to take any further initiative against the Nepalese Army. Thus by mid-February, of the four British commanders the Nepalese Army had faced till that time, Gillespie was dead, Marley had deserted, Wood was harassed into inactivity, and Martindell was practically incapacitated by over-cautiousness. It set the scene for Octorloney to soon show his mettle and change the course of the war.
Out West, the Nepalese were hopelessly overextended. Kumaun, a key link in Nepalese Army communications with the Far West, was defended by a small force, numbering about seven hundred and fifty men, with an equal number of Kumaoni irregulars, altogether about fifteen hundred men to defend a whole province. In addition, Doti which was to the East of Kumaun, had been practically stripped of troops. Bam Shah, as governor of Kumaun, had final responsibility for the defense of the province.
The British force, numbering initially over forty five hundred men, was easily able to out maneuver the Nepalese Army defenders and force them to abandon one post after another. Despite a significant victory over Captain Hearsey’s force, which had been sent on a flanking movement though Eastern Kumaun, and the capture of the captain himself, the Nepalese Army was unable to stem the tide of the British advance. Hasti Dal Shah arrived in Almora with a small body of reinforcement troops. A further reinforcement of four companies was sent from Kathmandu to aid the beleaguered defences of Kumaun, but the difficulties of communication through the hills prevented them from arriving in time to be of any help.
Meanwhile, Hastings sent Colonel Nicolls, Quartermaster-General for the British troops in India, to take charge of the Almora campaign and assigned two thousand regular troops to this front in addition to the very large number of irregulars already assigned to the area – all of this against fewer than one thousand Nepalese Army soldiers.
Hasti Dal Shah and some five hundred Nepalese Army men had set out from Almora to secure Almora’s Northern line of communications with Kathmandu. This party was intercepted. Hasti Dal Shah, the ablest Nepalese Army commander in this sector, was killed in the first moments of the battle. The Nepalese Army suffered terrible losses. When word of this disaster reached the defenders at Almora, they were stunned. The British closed in on Almora and the Nepalese Army was unable to prevent the British advance. Subsequently, the British managed to establish gun positions within seventy yards of the gate of the fort at Almora and the British artillery demolished the walls of the fort at point blank range. Bam Shah surrendered Almora on 27th Arpil of 1815.
The final Nepalese Army success of this period was in a way the most devastating to the opposition's morale. On 17th February word reached Martindell at Jaithak of the approach of a small party of two hundred Nepalese Army reinforcements moving from Malaon to Jaithak. Lieutenant Young with some two thousand irregulars was sent out to intercept them. Contact was made, and the Nepalese Army was surrounded. The Nepalese realized that there was little hope of victory, so they decided to die in battle rather than face the ignominy of surrender. With khukuri in hand they charged the irregulars, even though they were outnumbered ten to one. The irregulars broke before them, their morale shattered. From that time on the Nepalese Army treated the irregulars with contempt and whenever they encountered a force of irregulars, no matter how strong, they charged. Regardless of numbers, the irregulars were never once able to withstand the hill men and their khukuris. By the same token, a strong sense of mutual admiration started to take hold between the British regulars and the Nepalese.
The second battle of Malaon and Jaithak cut the Nepalese Army lines of communication between Central Nepal and the Far West. It also sealed the fate of Kazi Amar Singh Thapa at Malaon and Ranajor Singh Thapa at Jaithak. At Malaon, Major-General Ochterlony had moved with extreme care summoning reinforcements and heavy guns from Delhi until his total attack force consisted of over ten thousand men well-equipped with heavy cannon.
Kazi Amar Singh Thapa’s position in the Malaon Hills depended on Bilaspur in the lowlands for his food supplies, and the nature of the hills forced him to spread his forces very thinly in an attempt to defend every vantage point. Ochterlony cut off the supply of food from Bilaspur and then turned his attention to the intricate network of defensive posts that were designed to withstand any frontal assault. Although rear fortifications supported these posts, none could withstand a long cannonade by heavy guns. Because Ochterlony had sufficient troops to attack and overwhelm several positions simultaneously, the thinly spread Nepalese defences could be dangerously divided.
Ochterlony chose his target, a point on the ridge, and then proceeded to move slowly, consolidating each position that he took, and allowing the pioneers time to build roads so that the heavy guns could be moved forward to support each attack. After a series of carefully planned and executed moves, he succeeded in establishing a position on the crest of Deothal, not even over a thousand yards from Kazi Amar Singh Thapa’s main fort at Malaon. The old warrior Bhakti Thapa valiantly led assault after assault on this position, but he died during battle and the position did not fall. Immensely impressed by Bhakti's sustained courage against impossible odds, the British made the well appreciated and honorable gesture of returning his body with full military honours. The British superiority in numbers made it inevitable that they would be able to establish themselves and their heavy guns on a vantage point within range of Ranajor Singh’s fortifications, sooner or later.
Both Kazi Amar Singh Thapa and Ranajor Singh Thapa were thus hemmed in and looking down the barrels of the British guns when Bam Shah’s letter arrived, announcing the fall of Almora. Although the old commander was still reluctant to surrender, Kazi Amar Singh Thapa at last saw the hopelessness of the situation and, compelled by circumstances and the British guns, surrendered with honour for both himself and Ranajor Singh. The Nepalese Army positions in the Far West were turned over to the British on 15th of May 1815.
The outstretched Nepalese Army was defeated on the Western front i.e. Gadhawal and Kumaun area. Ochterlony had finally outfoxed Bada Kaji Amar Singh Thapa. He was the only successful British Commander in the first Nepal-Company campaign. Not surprisingly Lord Moira appointed him as the Main Operational Commander in the second offensive on the Bharatpur-Makawanpur-Hariharpur front with 17,000 strong invasion force, but again, most of them were Indian sepoys[41]
The British had given a 15 day ultimatum to Nepal to ratify a treaty on 28th November. But the points of the treaty were very difficult for Nepal to ratify quickly. The delay provided the excuse for the British to commence the second military campaign against Nepal. Colonel Bhaktabarsingh Thapa, another brother of Bhimsen Thapa, had been appointed as Sector Commander for defensive battles for the area from Bijaypur to Sindhuli Gadhi in the first campaign. In this second campaign, Bada Kaji Amarsingh Thapa was detailed as Sector Commander for Sindhuli Gadhi and the eastern front. Colonel Bhaktabarsingh Thapa was manning his headquaters at Makawanpur Gadhi. Major General David Ochterlony, was the overall commander against Nepal with a massive 17,000 British troops to assault the fronts including Upardang Gadhi, Sinchyang Gadhi, Kandrang Gadhi, Makawanpur Gadhi and Hariharpur Gadhi.
During the campaign in February 1816, Ochterlony decided to take a very infrequently used pass through the mountains. The failure there would have been a disaster for British. But the successful passage would allow Birith to directly emerge and attack the Gorkha's rear. Colonel Kelly and Colonel O’Hollorah followed the river Bagmati to reach Hariharpur Gadhi. Some of the heads of villagers were bribed for sensitive information about the defensive positions in the area of Hariharpur Gadhi. The information seriously compromised the Nepalese defences. Secret routes would have given the enemy advantage even if they were able to get only a battalion through. But the British were able to advance with more than a brigade’s strength. Colonel Kelly and Colonel O’Hollorah launched their attack from two different directions on 29th February. The Nepalese troops were eventually driven back from Hariharpur Gadhi after a big battle. Kaji Ranajor Thapa withdrew to Sindhuli Gadhi to link up with Bada Kaji Amarsingh Thapa. The British troops did not approach Sindhuli Gadhi and fell back to Makawanpur by the end of March 1815 AD.
The situation became very critical for Nepal and the British could have reached Kathmandu if the signing of the treaty was delayed any further. Major General David Ochterlony settled down to receive the treaty, signed by Nepal Durbar through Chandra Sekhar Upadhyaya, Pandit Gajaraj Mishra and finally though Bhaktabarsingh Thapa. Two days later the ratified treaty was handed over to the British in Makawanpur. The war ended with the Treaty of Sugauli and Nepal succeeded in remaining independent but lost about one-third her territory. The river Mechi became the new Eastern border and the Mahakali the Western boundary of Nepal.
Aayush Dhakal,the leutinant general from Nepal went to talk about Sugauli Sandhi with Britishers[42]
The Treaty of Sugauli was ratified on 4 March 1816. As per the treaty, Nepal lost Sikkim (including Darjeeling), the territories of Kumaon and Garhwal, and most of the lands of the Tarai. The Mechi River became the new eastern border and the Mahakali river the western boundary of Nepal. The British East India Company would pay 200,000 rupees annually to compensate for the loss of income from the Trai region. Kathmandu was also forced to accept a British Resident.[43]
The Tarai lands, however, proved difficult for the British to govern and some of them were returned to Nepal later in 1816 and the annual payments accordingly abolished.[44] However even after the conclusion of the Anglo-Nepalese War, the border issue between the two states was not yet settled. The boundary between Nepal and Oudh was not finally adjusted until 1830; and that between Nepal and the British territories remained as a matter of discussion between the two Governments for several years later.[45]
Despite the boast of Lord Moira to the British parliament on having increased the state coffers, the Gurkha War had in reality cost more than the combined cost of the campaigns against the Marathas and the Pindaris for which Lord Moira's administration is better known: Sicca Rs. 51,56,961 as against Sicca Rs. 37,53,789.[46] This was the kind of fact which greatly influenced the policy of the Company government in subsequent years. Thus, while the Company Government, in theory, thoroughly approved of the development of trade, especially in shawl wool, between Western Tibet and its territories, it was unprepared to take any decisive step to bring this about. It preferred to leave the Chinese in Tibet to their own devices, and hoped to avoid the risk, however slight, of another expensive hill war.[46]
Prime Minister Bhimsen Thapa, with the support of the queen regent Tripura Sundari, remained in power despite the defeat of Nepal. Other ruling families, particularly the Pandes, decried what they saw as Bhimsen Thapa’s submissive attitude towards the British. The prime minister however had been able to retain power by maintaining a large, modernized army and politically dominating the court during the minority of King Rajendra Bikram Shah, (reigned 1816–1847). Additionally, he was able to freeze out the Pandes from power by appointing members of his own family into positions of authority.
When queen Tripura Sundari died in 1832, Bhimsen Thapa began to lose influence. In 1833, Brian Hodgson became British resident, openly favouring Bhimsen Thapa’s opponents, and in 1837 the king announced his intention to rule independently, depriving the prime minister and his nephew of their military powers. After the eldest son of the queen died, Bhimsen Thapa was falsely accused of attempting to poison the prince. Although acquitted, the Thapas were in turmoil. When the head of the Pande family, Rana Jang Pande, became prime minister, he had Bhimsen Thapa re-imprisoned; Bhimsen Thapa committed suicide in August 1839.
For his part, David Ochterlony received thanks from both Houses of Parliament and became the first officer in the British East India Company to be awarded the GCB. Lord Moira also reinstated him as Resident at Delhi and he lived in the style appropriate to a very senior figure of the Company. However, after Lord Moira left India – succeeded by Lord Amherst as Governor-General in 1823 – Ochterlony fell out of favor.
In 1825 the Raja of Bharatpur died and the six-year-old heir to the throne, whom Ochterlony supported, was usurped by his cousin Durjan Sal. When Durjan Sal failed to submit to Ochterlony’s demands to vacate the throne, the British general prepared to march on Bharatpur. He did not receive the backing of the new Governor-General however, and after Amherst countermanded his orders, Ochterlony resigned, as Amherst had anticipated. This episode badly affected the ailing general who died shortly after on 14 July 1825. A 165-foot-high memorial was later erected in Calcutta in his memory; however, Sir David Ochterlony’s greatest legacy is the continuing recruitment of Gorkhas into the British and Indian armies.
Soon after Ochterlony's resignation Amherst was himself obliged to do what Ochterlony had prepared to do, and laid siege to Bharatpur.[41]
David Ochterlony and the political agent William Fraser were quick to recognize the potential of Gorkha soldiers in British service. During the war the British were keen to use defectors from the Gorkha army and employ them as irregular forces. His confidence in their loyalty was such that in April 1815 he proposed forming them into a battalion under Lieutenant Ross called the Nasiri regiment. This regiment, which later became the 1st King George’s Own Gurkha Rifles, saw action at the Malaun fort under the leadership of Lieutenant Lawtie, who reported to Ochterlony that he "had the greatest reason to be satisfied with their exertions".
About 5,000 men entered British service in 1815, most of whom were not ‘real’ Gorkhas but Kumaonis, Garhwalis and other Himalayan hill men. These groups, eventually lumped together under the term Gurkha, became the backbone of British Indian forces.
As well as Ochterlony’s Gorkha battalions, William Fraser and Lieutenant Frederick Young raised the Sirmoor battalion, later to become the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles; an additional battalion, the Kumaon battalion was also raised eventually becoming the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles. None of these men fought in the second campaign.